Higher-Order Evidence in Epistemology, Ethics, and Aesthetics V Event

As finite creatures, our capacity to acquire and retain information is limited; so too is our capacity to process that information. Corresponding to these two sources of mistake are two kinds of evidence. Sometimes a person receives evidence that suggests that what they believe is false, that what they admire is not admirable, or that what they decide is not best. This is first-order evidence. Sometimes a person receives evidence that their belief, feeling, or decision results from (e.g.) fallacious reasoning, snobbery, or implicit bias. This is higher-order evidence. It need not suggest that what they believe is false, that what they admire is not admirable, or that what they decide is not best; but it does suggest that their response to or estimation of their first-order evidence is flawed in some way. This workshop will explore how we can and should accommodate higher-order evidence in our deliberations.

This is the last in a series of workshops on Higher-Order Evidence in Epistemology, Ethics, and Aesthetics supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/S006338/1).

The event will be held online. Papers will be circulated in advance. It is free to participate but spaces are limited. To register, please write to the organiser by 11 January 2021 with your name and affiliation.

Organiser

Daniel Whiting

Invited speakers

Joshua DiPaolo (California State)

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (Helsinki)

Fabienne Peter (Warwick)

Michael Rush (Birmingham)

Ema Sullivan-Bissett (Birmingham)